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SYMPOSIUM: THE USE OF
FORCE IN THE POST-COLD
WAR ERA

The Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era:
An Introduction
VED

P.

NANDA*

I.
After the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Carter, authorized collective measures against Iraq's invasion
and annexation of Kuwait in Resolution 678,1 the United States and the
coalition troops struck Saddam Hussein's occupying forces in Iraq.2 The
43-day Gulf War forced Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and accept the
terms of a permanent cease-fire arrangement.' Since the end of the war,
the United Nations has been actively engaged in the implementation of
the historic Security Council Resolution 687, which in its nine-part text
set out specific conditions by which international peace and security
would be restored to the region.'
Resolution 687 is unprecedented in its reach. Under it, the Security
Council demanded that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the
1963 international boundary between them and called upon the Secre* Thompson G. Marsh Professor of International Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver College of Law. This is an adapted version of the
remarks made by the author as the opening address of a regional conference of the American Society of International Law, funded by the Ford Foundation, and hosted by the International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver College of Law, at the Law School on
March 15, 1991.
1. See Security Council Resolution 678, Nov. 29, 1990, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1565
(1990). For an account of U.N. action, see Ved Nanda, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait - the
U.N. Response, 15 S. ILL. U.L.J. 431 (1991) [hereinafter Nanda].
2. Hostilities began on the evening of January 16, 1991. For summary statements of the
representatives of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United States on the beginning of the
military operations, see U.N. CHRONICLE, June 1991, at 9.
3. See War in Persian Gulf Area Ends, id. at 4.
4. Security Council Resolution 687, April 3, 1991, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 847 (1991).
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tary-General to help demarcate that boundary. 5 Among other provisions,
the Security Council decided that, "Iraq shall unconditionally accept the
destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision," of all its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with
a range greater than 150 kilometers, and provided for the development of
a plan to ensure its implementation.6 The Council also reaffirmed Iraq's
liability "under international law for any direct loss, damage .... or injury
to foreign governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of its un7
lawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait."
The debate will undoubtedly continue on whether the action by the
coalition forces was an international enforcement action or a collective
self-defense action,8 whether the decision process leading to the adoption
and execution of Security Council Resolution 678 was in conformity with
the letter and spirit of the U.N. Charter,9 and what the implications of
the Security Council decisions are for future action.10
My purpose here is not to enter this important debate but to make
some preliminary observations on the subject of this conference, namely,
the use of force in the post-cold war era.
II.
By all accounts the process of ending the cold war has not only earnestly begun but has gathered considerable momentum. Consider the dynamics of economic, political and social changes sweeping the erstwhile
Eastern bloc states. The transformation of societies in Central and Eastern Europe, independence of the Baltic Republics, and the disintegration
of centralized authority and control of the federal government in the Soviet Union and the evolving relationships between and among the other
Republics there, are unambiguous indicators of a historic change. The
Warsaw Pact is extinct, NATO is seeking a reorientation and a fresh
mandate, bipolarity has ended, Europe has a new persona, and the forces
of democratization, liberalization, and privatization are auguring a new
era in East-West relations. This post-cold war environment presents a
unique opportunity for revisiting the existing norms on the use of force in
the international arena.
The new era holds promise for the establishment of what President

5.
6.
7.
8.

See
See
See
See

id., Part A, at 849.
id., Part C, at 850-51.
id., Part E, at 852.
Eugene Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense?,
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 506 (1991). See also LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER
(Lori F. Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds. 1991).
9. See Burns Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision
Making: PrecariousLegitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1991).
10. See Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 2
(1991). See also Agora, The Gulf Crisis in Internationaland Foreign Relations Law, id. at
63.
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Bush calls "a new world order." In his 1991 address on the State of the
Union, the President explained that at stake in the Gulf War was the
"big idea" of such an order, "where diverse nations are drawn together in
common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind - peace
and security, freedom, and the rule of law.""
In the same address, after predicting that the coalition forces "will
succeed in the Gulf," he suggested that when they did, "the world community will have sent an enduring warning to any dictator or despot, present or future, who contemplates . . .aggression.""

He continued: "The

world can, therefore, seize this opportunity to fulfill the long-held promise of a new world order, where brutality will go unrewarded and aggression will meet collective resistance."1 3
There are legitimate questions about the meaning and content of the
new world order, and as to how new it is, and what is new about it. 4 It is,
however, fair to conclude from President Bush's statements that the new
world order would be built on the foundation of the rule of law and a
regime of collective resistance to deter aggression, and if deterrence fails,
collective measures to resist aggression and restore international peace
and security.
The initial United Nations response to the Gulf Crisis was marked by
a resolute stand of the Security Council against Iraq's aggression. The
Council acted within six hours after the invasion on August 2, 1990, and
adopted a resolution, by a vote of 14 to 0, with Yemen abstaining, condemning the Iraqi invasion and demanding an unconditional and immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait."3 The Security Council acted
collectively, in a manner the U.N. founders had prescribed in the Charter
and had envisaged that it would act for the maintenance of international
peace and security. Its next response was four days later, with the imposition of a sweeping sanctions regime against Iraq, including an arms and
trade ban. 6 The Council decided to establish a sanctions committee to
monitor the implementation of the resolution. Again, no Council member
voted against the resolution, although Cuba and Yemen abstained, and
the vote was 13 to none.
When several more Security Council resolutions failed to bring about
a change in Iraq's aggressive and intransigent policies in the Gulf, the
Council on November 29, 1990, after lengthy deliberations, adopted a resolution authorizing states to use force in order to implement its resolu11. George Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union, 27 WKLY.COMP. PslIDENrIAL Docs., Jan 29, 1991, at 90.
12. Id. at 95.
13. Id.

14. See, e.g., Symposium: What's New About the New World Order?, 15

FLETCHER

Fo-

RUM OF WORLD AFF. 1 (Summer 1991); Louis Sohn, How New is the New International
Legal Order?, 20 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y (1992).
15. See Nanda, supra note 1, at 434-35.
16. See id. at 435-36.
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tions. It gave Iraq "one final opportunity, as a pause of good will," to
comply fully with its resolutions by January 15, 1991. If Iraq failed to
comply, the Council authorized states cooperating with the Government
of Kuwait "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement the Security Council .. . [r]esolutions and to restore international peace and
7
security in the area.

1

When the coalition forces struck on January 16, 1991, it was not a
Security Council action undertaken pursuant to Article 42 after the determination by the Council that the measures it had taken under Articles
40 and 41 against Iraq had proven inadequate. As a highly regarded former U.N. official has noted, the United States assumed the leadership
role during the Gulf crisis in exploring a "parallel operation" to that of
the Security Council for the protection of Saudi Arabia."' Among others,
Professor Richard Falk has criticized the Security Council for its refusal
"to control the United States and the coalition, allowing the U.N. to become formally associated with waging unrestricted warfare" in the Gulf.,'
The Report of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, issued in September 1991, offers some pertinent observations
on the U.N. action in the Gulf crisis:
Another important aspect is that the enforcement action was not
carried out exactly in the form foreseen by Articles 42 et sequentia of
Chapter VII. Instead, the Council authorized the use of force on a
national and coalition basis. In the circumstances and given the costs
imposed and capabilities demanded by modern warfare, the arrangement seemed unavoidable. However, the experience of operations in
the Gulf suggests the need for a collective reflection on questions relating to the future use of the powers vested in the Security Council
under Chapter VII.
In order to preclude controversy, these questions should include
the mechanisms required for the Council to satisfy itself that the rule
of proportionality in the employment of armed force is observed and
the rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts are complied with. Moreover, careful thought will have to be given to ensuring
that the application of Chapter VII measures is not perceived to be
overextended. In today's conditions of economic interdependence, the
effect of the imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions on third
States that are economic partners of the offender State requires that
Article 50 of the Charter be supplemented by appropriate agreements
creating obligations to assist concretely the disadvantaged third State
or States. The human effect of sanctions on the population of an offending State, if it lacks the political means to bring about a reversal

17. Id. at 440. See generally id. at 436-40.
18. See Brian Urquhart, Learning from the Gulf, N.Y. REviEw OF BOOKS, March 7,
1991, at 34.
19. Richard Falk, Reflections on the Gulf War Experience: Force and War in the
United Nations System 22 (manuscript dated May 28, 1991, on record at the offices of the
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y).
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of the policy that gives rise to the'offence, will also need to be carefully borne in mind. As I stated at meetings of the Security Council,
enforcement is a collective engagement, which requires a discipline all
its own.2 0

This criticism of the United Nations action notwithstanding, the fact
remains that during the early phases of the Gulf Crisis, the Security
Council demonstrated the capacity and willingness to take collective measures for repelling aggression. The post-cold war era offers the opportunity to realize the United Nations' potential for the maintenance of international peace and security. This would undoubtedly include the use of
collective measures as envisaged under Chapter VII, especially the establishment of a Military Staff Committee and standing forces under U.N.
command for peacekeeping and even enforcement purposes.21 But, even
more important, effective mechanisms will be instituted, including the enhanced use of the authority of the Secretary-General's office in the engagement of preventive diplomacy and toward the promotion, utilization
and further strengthening of the available means for pacific settlement of
international disputes.
This new opportunity can be distinguished from the period following
the Second World War, which was also popularly regarded as the dawn of
a new era,22 in that the present period results from superpower cooperation during a period of peace: cooperation was chosen as a preferred policy by the two superpowers rather than as a last resort forced upon them
by a struggle against a common threat. Viewed in this light, it is not surprising that the new global order after World War II failed due to lack of
cooperation since the common threat had been removed.22
Despite the fact that the prospects for the present era of cooperation
seem brighter, it is foolhardy to assume that there remain no severe
threats to global peace and security. For example, ethnic and regional
conflicts, especially claims for self-determination, are major potential
threats.
III.
The papers published in this symposium issue are the product of a
Regional Conference of the American Society of International Law, entitled "Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era," hosted by the International Legal Studies Program of the University of Denver College of Law
and funded by the Ford Foundation. The Conference was held on March
15, 1991 at the College of Law. The subject areas discussed ranged from

20. U.N. Doc. A/46/1, at 607 (Sept. 6, 1991).
21. See, e.g., Bruce Russett & James S. Sutterlin, The U.N. in a New World Order, 70
FOREIGN AFF. 69, 83 (Spring 1991).
22. See Brian Urquhart, Problems and Prospects of the United Nations, 44 INT'L J.
803, 804 (Autumn 1989).
23. See id. at 804-05.
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humanitarian intervention, self-defense, and self-determination, to the
use of the United Nations and other multilateral machinery to limit and
regulate the unauthorized use of force in the international arena.
Professor Kevin Ryan discusses "humanitarian intervention," that is,
intervention by a state in the territory of another state on humanitarian
grounds. The ostensible purpose of such interventions is to bring a halt to
egregious violations of human rights. He analyzes the problems inherent
in the application of this doctrine, concluding with the warning that "nations must be extremely wary of using force, regardless of how legitimate
that use may seem to be." This warning is given because of the strict
prohibition under international law on use of force against the territorial
integrity and political independence of another state24 and the inadequacies of the existing mechanisms for international fact-finding. Professor
Ryan acknowledges, however, the primacy of human rights under contemporary international law and the duty of states under Articles 55 and 56
to promote respect for international human rights.
Of particular concern to Professor Ryan is intervention on behalf of a
people claiming self-determination. He contends that the doctrine of selfdetermination is "extremely complicated." Nevertheless, once the recommended criteria are met, he would consider humanitarian intervention legitimate even in cases involving the claim of self-determination, prefering
that such intervention be undertaken multilaterally.
Professor David Penna inquires into the United Nations' role in security. He discusses the evolution of the self-defense exception to the rule
against the use of force in the cold war setting. He then presents alternative systems of self-defense, including their logistical ramifications, and
analyzes the Gulf conflict. Last, he explores the application of the selfdefense doctrine in the new post-cold war system.
In examining the United Nations' response to the invasion of Kuwait,
Professor Penna studies the various resolutions of the Security Council,
their ambiguities and uncertainties, and the interpretation of these resolutions by the coalition partners. He discusses how various states determined whether the criteria of necessity and proportionality in judging the
permissibility of the use of force were met. In this context, he examines
the differentiation between state actions in collective self-defense under
Article 51 and U.N. enforcement actions under Chapter VII.
Professor Penna concludes by stating that the powers given to states
under Article 51 and the power of the Security Council to "maintain international peace and security" became "fused" -

or "confused" -

in

the Kuwait crisis. The implications, he finds, are for an increased role for
the Security Council in self-defense determinations and for states in collective self-defense actions. Ultimately he concludes that the Kuwait cri24. See U.N.

CHARTER

art. 2(4), which embodies the authoritative community proscrip-

tion of "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
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sis signals the globalization of the security system, a promising evolution.
Dr. Charles Milligan studies the option of economic sanctions against
Iraq as a viable alternative to the use of force in the Gulf crisis. He begins
by detailing the U.N. Charter's provisions which call for restrained measures in the enforcement of Security Council actions. He notes that force
is only to be used as a last resort, and only within limitations placed upon
it under the authorizing resolution and provisions of other articles of the
U.N. Charter.
Next Dr. Milligan describes hindrances to the effectiveness of the
U.N., stating that the cold war made impossible the cooperation between
states necessary for progress under the U.N. However, he lauds the U.N.
peace-keeping forces as being of tremendous potential in the avoidance of
massive hostilities.
Dr. Milligan then examines the costs .of the Gulf war, including the
financial loss, loss of life, the plight of refugees, degradation of the environment, and the plunder of resources. By contrast he studies the nonviolent alternatives, principally the use of economic sanctions, including the
disadvantages of sanctions and why such alternatives are politically unpopular. He concludes by noting a double standard between the pronouncements of peaceful settlement of disputes by the United States for
other nations and its handling of its own conflicts. In the end, he emphasizes: "There are times in life when destructive force must be used. But
this should be a last resort in international relations, and if we are ever to
have a livable world it is imperative that we learn better ways to use alternatives to force."
Professor James Nafziger presents a comprehensive study of what he
calls, "the battle-strewn terrain of self-determination and humanitarian
intervention." His goal is to "highlight the aridity of those rights." He
accomplishes this goal admirably by providing an appropriate historical
context and by analyzing these concepts in light of state practice, authoritative pronouncements of regional and international intergovernmental
organizations, judicial decisions, and publicists' writings.
After demonstrating the normative ambiguities inherent in these
rights and raising pertinent questions related to the difficulty of applying
these concepts in a changing world, Professor Nafziger suggests that "the
new reality of a community of power" demands that multilateral decisions be taken pertaining to the application of these concepts. Specifically, he illustrates how this might occur by reference to the United Nations and the European Community. He concludes:
Perhaps the day will arrive when unilateral self-determination and
humanitarian intervention will have become largely obsolete. Instead,
turning these terms around, the global community will rely on international and regional organizations to make binding humanitarian determinations about self-determination by states as well as foreign interventions. We may learn to rely, after so many battles, on the better
angels of our nature ....

8
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IV.
This symposium issue has discussed only selected aspects of the use
of force. The message is clear: the post-cold war era promises the regulation of the unauthorized use of force by multilateral means. Another message which is implicit even if not well-defined in these papers is that
states share a common interest in voluntarily exercising principled constraints on the use of force. Whether and when this new world order is
established, where the rule of law and not the rule of the jungle prevails,
will be determined by the vision and will of the major actors in the international arena. Consequently, the primary responsibility for the establishment of such order lies with the permanent members of the Security
Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

